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ABSTRACT 
The authors explore some issues with the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
crime reporting and recording systems which currently produce 
Open Crime Data. The availability of Open Crime Data seems to 
create  a  potential  data  ecosystem  which  would  encourage 
crowdsourcing,  or  the  creation  of  social  machines,  in  order  to 
counter some of these issues. While such solutions are enticing, 
we suggest that in fact the theoretical solution brings to light fairly 
compelling  problems,  which  highlight  some  limitations  of 
crowdsourcing  as  a  means  of  addressing  Berners-Lee‟s  “social 
constraint.”  The  authors  present  a  thought  experiment  –  a 
Gendankenexperiment - in order to explore the implications, both 
good and bad, of a social machine in such a sensitive space and 
suggest a Web Science perspective to pick apart the ramifications 
of  this  thought  experiment  as  a  theoretical  approach  to  the 
characterisation of social machines. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.1.2 [User/Machine Systems] Human information processing. 
K.4.1. [Computers and Society] Public Policy Issues. 
General Terms 
Experimentation, Human Factors, Theory. 
Keywords 
Open  data;  crime  data;  transparency;  trust;  social  machines. 
network science. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In “Weaving The Web”, Professor Sir Tim Berners-Lee explains 
that, “Real life is and must be full of all kinds of social constraint 
– the very processes from which “society” arises. Computers help 
if  we use them to create abstract social machines on the Web: 
processes  in  which  the  people  do  the  creative  work  and  the 
machine does the administration.” [3]  
Is there any combination of person and computational system that 
isn‟t  a  social  machine  under  this  description?  If  almost  any 
combination  of  human  and  computing  device  can  be  a  social 
machine, how can we start to understand how these work, without 
being more specific?  
 
How can we make predictions about success factors under such a 
general description? Does a social machine have to incorporate a 
“machine” in the sense that we might think of a computer, or can 
machine be used in the wider sense, as in some sense of a Turing 
Machine; a series of computations? And how can social machines 
actually cope with the “social constraint” Berners-Lee referred to 
– the “processes from which „society‟ arises”? Is it possible, for 
example,  to  use  crowdsourcing,  or  combinations  of  social 
networks, the web and mobile phones to “fight crime”, as Luis 
Von  Ahn
1  has suggested? In order to explore some of these 
questions, we look at them within the context of Open Crime Data 
in the U.K..  
The structure of this paper is that first, we consider U.K.  open 
crime data (data that can be freely used, reused and redistributed 
by anyone) and discuss social, technical and policy issues arising 
from  its collection.  Second, we discuss an app in development 
that  might  exemplify  a  solution  –  a  social  machine  -  to  these 
current  problems  with  crime  data.  We  consider  what  questions 
this  raises,  from  the  perspective  of  a  thought  experiment  or 
Gedankenexperiment. We finally consider these  questions, both 
with regard to the real problems caused by such an app, and also 
how these real world problems might inform the classification and 
definition of social machines.  
Lack  of  space  prevents  robust  criminological  discussion, and a 
deep  exploration  of  existing  social  machines,  although  such 
considerations will be made in more depth in other work. 
2.  CRIME DATA 
Currently  the  U.K.  government  uses  crime  open  data  via  the 
website www.police.uk in order to help further the transparency 
and  accountability  programme  for  the  policing  and  criminal 
justice  system.  Www.police.uk  is  pivotal  in  the  Government‟s 
policing and justice reform agenda; through helping the public to 
hold  their  local  police  to  account,  with  this  accountability 
mediated by Police and Crime Commissioners (P.C.C.s). Crime 
data coming from 43 U.K. police forces is represented visually on 
street-level maps; inputting a postcode, name of a town, village or 
street takes the visitor to the crime map, or they can examine the 
open data that feeds the maps.  
                                                                  
1 “…social networks and cell phones really helped the revolutions 
in the Arab world…in the same way, it is possible for them to 
help  address  things  like  crime  in  Latin  America.” 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/07/qa-captcha-creator-would-like-
to-tap-crowdsourcing-to-fight-crime/ 
Copyright is held by the International World Wide Web 
Conference Committee (IW3C2). IW3C2 reserves the right 
to provide a hyperlink to the author's site if the Material is 
used in electronic media. WWW 2013 Companion, May 
13–17, 2013, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. ACM 978-1-4503-
2038-2/13/05. 
 2.1 Measuring Crime 
Although the website has had over 200,000 hits a day since it first 
came  into  use,  (averaging  over  340,000  in  January  2013), 
showing huge public engagement with this information, there are 
problems  with  this  recorded  crime  data,  particularly  where  it 
relates to attempts “to measure the amount, nature and distribution 
of crime in society.”[19] From deciding a crime has occurred, to 
reporting  and  recording,  there  are  areas  in  which  the  data  can 
mislead.  
Although the figures appear to be changing [17] certain types of 
crime are still reported to the police more than others as a result 
of, for example, economic and insurance incentives. Police may 
feel that dominant problems in a neighbourhood are car crime and 
burglary,  while  sexual  assault,  domestic  violence  and  similar 
crimes remain under-reported. [10] “Victims of domestic violence 
or  rape  may  worry  about  whether  the  police  will  take  them 
seriously  or  whether  they  will  face  reprisals.”  [18]  Recently 
recognised  in  the  U.K.  as  a  crime,  stalking  can  be  hard  to 
quantify.  When  does  knowledge  of  a  loved  one‟s  movements 
become  privacy-threatening  surveillance?  Confronting  domestic 
abuse can depend on the victim realising that a crime has taken 
place, that abuse is predicated by their mental state, not just the 
commission  of  aggressive  acts  at  specific times.  There  may  be 
negative consequences for victims if they report these crimes, not 
only from attackers, but psychologically, morally and socially. It 
is hard to quantify and act on these sorts of crime, given normal 
police reporting mechanisms which are geared around the notion 
of crime as a digital event, both as the victim perceives it, and as it 
is enacted, not an analogue process. 
Each of the 43 police forces has its own reporting procedures and 
practices. The Information Commissioner‟s Office (I.C.O.) is risk-
averse  with  regard  to  privacy  and  the  current  data  protection 
paradigm, so police data is anonymised and aggregated with little 
victim consultation
 since geolocation is privacy-threatening
2. Data 
often only arrives at  Police.uk after a period of 4-7 weeks. The 
data indicates trends, but is not up-to-date or accurate enough to 
be able to help in tracking crimes as they occur - descriptive but 
not  predictive  of  crime.  Other  forms  of  data  gathering  occur 
through  victim  surveys,  such  as  the  British  Crime  Survey, 
(B.C.S.)  suggesting  a  “dark  figure”  of  unrecorded  crime.  For 
example,  in  contrast  to  open  police  crime  data,  victim  surveys 
show that only 15% of victims report to the police and that of 
reported crimes, conviction rates are around 30%. Five per cent of 
females have been victims of a serious sexual offence since they 
were 16, 20% have been a victim of some sexual offence since 
they were 16 and 2.5% of females and 0.4% of males had been 
victims of sexual offences in the previous 12 months. [13] 
It is recognised that “official” U.K. crime data is problematic, and 
that the trust of communities in the police needs rebuilding, so 
that “information about crime flows from the community to the 
police. Information is the lifeblood of solving crime.” If  police 
work is knowledge work, rather than the public sphere conception 
of  crime  fighting,  it  seems  that  current  systems  do  not  have 
enough  of  a  sociotechnical  approach  to  the  production  of 
knowledge coming from victims. Instead this knowledge is shaped 
                                                                  
2 See 
http://www.ico.org.uk/for_organisations/sector_guides/~/media/
documents/library/Data_Protection/Detailed_specialist_guides/c
rime_mapping_advice.ashx for fuller explanation. 
by reporting systems and institutional demands for knowledge.
3 
[7]  This  causes  skew  -  victim  survey  data  i s  geared  around 
perceptions of “fear of crime” predicated on events that victims 
have experienced. These events should theoretically correspond to 
the U.K. Police Open Data, if the crime has been reported and 
recorded. However, there is no overt correspondence, yet crime 
policy is very much driven by reference to this “fear of crime”. 
This places data in difficulty; neither data set solves the problems 
that it could, while policy hangs off data about public perception 
of crime that does not align with recorded crime figures. 
2.2 Theoretical Solutions 
With  the  technology  now  available,  can  we  address  these 
problems?  Researchers from  The  Korean Advanced Institute of 
Science and Technology (KAIST) have an app in development – 
Risk Alert - that allows the crowdsourcing of reports on crime and 
that allows gradual and victim-led levels of disclosure, as opposed 
to the (mostly) one-size-fits-all I.C.O. data protection paradigm. 
Risk Alert uses open data sources, such as crime open data, to 
supplement  environmental  information  provided  by  users: 
showing  floating  population,  hospitals,  police  stations,  CCTV. 
Risk  Alert  shows  a  mapped  location-based  environmental  risk 
score,  and  enables  reporting  of  violence,  harassment  or 
threatening  behaviour  either  to  police,  friends  or  family.  Users 
assess their own environment to give risk scores and comments on 
their current location, checking for nearby police stations, broken 
streetlights, or suspicious behavior and can report assaults.  
3. THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
Risk Alert sits within a coterie of apps that address the issue of 
violence. “These deployments…guide the women facing violence 
to  resources  and  help.  Most  of  all,  these  initiatives  create 
testimonies and offer the victims a presence and a voice…crucial 
in the aftermath of crimes where victims are coerced into silence 
or  purposefully  isolated.”[6][5][2].  However  our 
Gedankenexperiment  takes  a  deliberative  step  back  from  such 
apps, in that we consider how the “declarative social machinery” 
that they represent enables us to ask questions about privacy, trust 
and accountability and other forms of “social constraint”, from the 
outset  and  about  whether  we  currently  have  nuanced  enough 
concepts  to  understand  the  impact  that  such  a  social  machine 
might have. 
Without  actually  deploying  this system, we can imagine that it 
could  very  easily  be  used  to  crowdsource  data,  while  allowing 
victims  control  over  the  process  of  disclosure  –  this  system  is 
analogue, rather than the digital “either-it-is-a-crime-or-it-isn‟t” of 
the formalised reporting system that feeds U.K. open crime data. 
It  takes  a  step  forward  from  “tiplines”  such  as 
http://www.crimestoppers-uk.org  in the UK, as information is not 
mediated by the authorities before being represented. Whereas a 
telephone  hotline  that  allows  reporting  of  crimes  anonymously 
could still be said to be a sort of social machine, such systems 
have information filtered in a way that allows for crowdsourcing 
but does not then represent information in a distributed fashion.  
                                                                  
3“The „forms police‟ work hard to restrict the narrative capacity of 
police officers. This restriction has evolved through successive 
changes  to  the  communications  formats  of  reports...  from  an 
open narrative to fixed-choice risk classifications.”[7] Our hypothetical app is similar to http://www.patientslikeme.com/ 
in allowing users to decide how much they disclose. It might have 
predictive properties, since crime data should end up being more 
locatable, informative and up to date, and therefore be used to 
help  prevent  crime.  Such  a  system  expands  on  the  currently 
available older, verified, government open data, not necessarily 
contradicting  it,  creating  a  “grey figure” from more up-to-date, 
less verified and less formalised data. It would enable the building 
of  trust  in  the  reporting  system;  trust  is  a  key  concept  with 
reporting some crimes. It is recognised that technical architectures 
can shape realities; this could be one of the new architectures that 
help  re-shape  knowledge  and  experience  of  crime.  [12]  This 
system  could  create  contextualised,  narrative-based,  community 
knowledge  about  crime  with  an  understanding  of  how  current 
recording systems shape our knowledge of crime. And of course, 
such  a  social  machine  changes  the  dynamic  of  the  current 
transparency  regime  where  performance  data  are  produced  by 
those  very  people  who  are  being  held  to  account  -  with  the 
resulting sometimes tragic consequences. 
4 This now allows for 
the crowdsourcing of data on crime which then can be matched 
against  the  statistics  produced  by  the  police  themselves,  and 
dialogue about accountability is fed by richer, multi -dimensional 
data. 
We must however ask how differently might such a machine be 
used, for example, in Europe and Asia? We come up against 
notions  of  identity  and  privacy  as  mediated  -  or  not  -  by 
anonymisation  predicated  on  the  U.K.‟s  old  data  protection 
regime; these notions are vastly different as we traverse the globe, 
which  such  an  app  could  easily  do.  Globally  there  are  legal 
treatments  of  data  that  would  make  a  huge  social  impact  if 
somehow incorrectly deployed. If we have certain expectations of 
privacy in the U.K. we trust that our data will not be exposed in a 
way  that  reveals  our  identity.  We  must  consider  not  just  “the 
cyber-infrastructure  of  high-speed  supercomputers  and  their 
networked interconnections, but the even more powerful human 
interactions enabled by these underlying systems.” [9] We must 
consider risk - such a reporting architecture could be dangerous, if 
identities  were  leaked,  lost  or  let  slip.  We  have  to  consider 
provenance – data will not be auditable without raising a lot of 
questions about its reliability. It would be open to trolls, to false 
reports, and the risk of vigilantism. Some of these issues could be 
addressed by the use of forensic linguistic analysis and machine 
learning techniques to check for unusual patterns of activity, or 
for one voice submitting multiple reports. However, overall, these 
questions make us think about how such an app stretches existing 
social understandings and norms when it has the capacity to bring 
people together globally? Could it solve more problems than it 
has created? Is it what Morozov calls “solutionism”, an “opiate of 
gamification,  algorithmic  surveillance,  and  technological 
determinism?”
5 How do we treat issues of trust, privacy, legality 
and  ethics?  Do  we  need  to  create  global  systems  that  impose 
global standards or systems that are flexible enough to allow for 
local  technically  mediated  interpretations  of  the  very  social 
constraint that drives the need for such machines? For example, 
www.Ushahidi.com is used as a global crime-reporting platform, 
but  presumably  some  of  the  information  it  holds  is  not  just 
lifeblood for solving crime but could potentially spill the lifeblood 
                                                                  
4 http://gu.com/p/3e4b8 
5http://davidsasaki.name/2013/02/future-imperfect-evgeny-
morozov-vs-steven-johnson/ 
of  those  using  the  system.  Can  these  questions  enable  us to 
deepen our  understanding of social machines and the issues we 
might encounter in trying to solve these problems? 
4. CRIME SOCIAL MACHINES 
Having asked these questions about social and legal norms, we 
can go a little deeper into the characterisation of social machines 
in order to see if we can further illustrate some of the inherent 
difficulties with a machine that helps with such sensitive data.  
What creates a successful social machine? What drives people to 
use  the  machine?  What  incentives  are  there?  In  the  case  of  a 
crime-reporting system we can see that a user might be asking for 
help,  while  contributing  to  a  sensitive  crime  dataset  -  an 
apparently  straightforward  incentive.  Incentives  often  map  into 
knowledge representation in these machines. How easily is this 
done  in  the  case  of  assault  or  abuse  data?    To  return  to  our 
thought experiment, and the app, we know that self-identification 
increase a victim‟s feeling of threat [1][14] along with self-blame, 
guilt,  shame,  humiliation,  fear  of  the  perpetrator,  of  not  being 
believed or of being accused of playing a role in the crime and 
lack  of  trust  in  the  criminal  justice  system.  These  fears  are 
significantly  less  applicable  in  an  online  setting  owing  to  the 
anonymity  of  the  Web,  which  allows  the  victim  to  disclose  as 
little  or  as  much  of  what  has  happened  as  they  choose,  as 
previously discussed. It seems mediating crime reporting via web-
based social machines provides a good incentive.  
But when discussing incentive we must define what this is. In the 
case of a victim of crime, we must surely refer first to their inner 
knowledge of the crime, as an incentive for reporting the crime 
and  thus  their  mental  or  cognitive  state.  It  is  this  state  which 
persuades  the  user  that  by  carrying  out  act  A,  the  act  of 
contributing to the social machine, they will achieve goal B, their 
desired  end  result.  A  and  B  together  create  the  incentive. 
However,  to  understand  the  mental  state,  or  successive  mental 
states  of  a  victim  of  domestic  abuse  is  a  complex  process.  As 
stated above, one of the problems with reporting domestic abuse 
is recognition on the part of a victim that a crime has taken place. 
Research shows that this “knowledge of crime” actually ebbs and 
flows in the mind of the victim, if we are to talk of a mental state, 
goal  or  intention,  which  maps  into  knowledge  that  is  to  be 
captured and represented by the machine. How do we map these 
analogue  and  fluctuating  states  of  knowledge  of  crime  from  a 
crime  victim  and  therefore,  incentives,  into  characterisation  of 
social machines? We turn to further definitions of social machines 
in order to explore this question. 
4.1 Computer mediated social interaction 
Following  Berners-Lee‟s  definition  above,  we  find  another 
definition  coming  from  Robertson  and  Giunchiglia.  [15]  They 
state that the ubiquity of personal devices and sensors changes the 
way we think about computation. A social computation is one for 
which  an  “executable  specification  exists  but  the  successful 
implementation  of  this  specification  depends  upon  computer 
mediated  social  interaction  between  the  human  actors  in  its 
implementation”. They isolate the initiation of social computation, 
individuals‟  roles  in  computations  and  the  reinforcement  of 
adopted  specifications,  concluding  that  considerations  of 
understandings  of  incentive  structures  aligned  with  relevant 
populations let us consider knowledge representation and formal 
specifications in new ways. This elegantly hones our definition of 
social  machine,  but  leaves  the  “social”  element  largely 
unaccounted for. We know that evolved machines (as with much technology)  are  underpinned  with  often  perverse,  unintended 
human  interactions,  that  intentions  can  ebb  and  flow  in  users‟ 
minds, we know of the to-and-fro of a victim unsure whether or 
not  they  are  a  victim,  creating  difficulty  in  formalising  their 
intentions, and that there are differing incentives on the part of 
those who “own” the machine and those who contribute. In fact 
these  varying  incentives  can  make  formal  specification  at  least 
onerous  and  perhaps  even  impossible  if  we  try  to  isolate 
predictors for success.  
Rather than proceeding from a top-down, definitional approach, 
we  can  try  to  identify  and  characterise  social  machines  via 
bottom-up,  empirical  examination.  We  can  look  at  common 
aspects of generally agreed social machines: their inputs, outputs 
and  computational  processes,  for  example.  The  following  are 
often agreed to be robust examples of social machines: 
Table 1. Examples of agreed social machines 
The DARPA balloon challenge 
is a competition exploring the 
roles the Internet and social 
networking play in the timely 
communication, wide-area 
team-building, and urgent 
mobilization required to solve 
broad-scope, time-critical 
problems. 
The Obama election campaign. See 
for example [11] on  how “seamless 
integration of social media and 
microblogging with the use of big 
data on clickstreams to track 
opinion…combined with offline 
door-to door operations” helped 
Obama win. 
 
http://www.ushahid.com 
crowdsources information on 
conflict or violence using 
multiple channels such as SMS, 
email, Twitter and the Web.  
http://duolingo.com/ enables the 
learning of new languages while 
translating texts on the web. 
http://fold.it/portal/is a computer 
games with a purpose (GWAP) 
enabling citizen science 
contributions.  
http://www.galaxyzoo.org/ Citizens 
classify large datasets of galaxies.  
RECAPTCHA is a CAPTCHA 
service that helps to digitize 
books, newspapers and radio 
shows.. 
https://www.crimereports.co.uk/Cri
meReports helps reduce, prevent and 
solve crime by enabling citizen 
dialogues with law-enforcement 
agencies.  
The SOCIAM group
6 is analysing characteristics that these and 
other identified soci al machines have in common.  [16]  Some 
points concern organisations of person and machine and whether 
they  are  used  altruistically  or  selfishly,  and  refer  to  “tasks”, 
“purpose”, “motivations and incentives”: “the social structure and 
motivation that sustains continued participation in these systems”. 
4.2 Genetic Variation 
Looking at incentives we found a difficulty in the mapping of an 
analogue representation of knowledge of crime in the mind of a 
user, seen as a sub-component of the machine.  Can we define 
intentions  and  goals  from  another  perspective,  applying  an 
evolutionary  view?  Do  social  machines  have  elements  of  non-
random  genetic  variation,  advantageous  to  characteristics  that 
enhance  their  reproduction?  Each  user  varies  in  terms  of  their 
intentions  as  they  build  into  the  machine  –  if  the  machine 
survives, then the variation in the minds of its users as they use it 
or build into it has led (truistically) to the machine‟s survival as 
we  analyse  “successful”  machines.  “Selection  does  not  have  a 
long-term  goal…selecting  those  characteristics  that  are 
                                                                  
6 See Acknowledgements for more information on the Group. 
advantageous within the environment at that...time.” [8] [4]  But 
we find that it is this very “genetic variation” that makes  looking 
for  certain  characteristics  that  specify  social  machines  hard, 
depending on the ecological circumstances of their users of whose 
evolving and mutating intentions, goals or incentives we can not 
speak  authoritatively.  Neuroscience  casts  doubt  on  whether  we 
can  relate  intention  to  behaviour  at  all;  less  skeptically,  going 
back to the victims reporting crime, we have evidence that victims 
of domestic violence do not experience crime as a single, digital, 
fixed-state  event.    Their  knowledge  of  their  experience  of  the 
crime  evolves  and  mutates  in  a  way  that  makes  such  a  social 
machine seem like a solution to the problem of reporting, but it 
also  makes  mapping  intentions  as  a  form  of  knowledge 
representation into system specifications an act of epistemological 
wrangling.  
5. CONCLUSIONS  
Whereas the  goal  or  task   element (and therefore the intention 
behind it) of a Turing Machine is fundamental to its definition, 
[20]  we  argue  that  the  social  machine  is  distinct;  it  is  not 
ontologically or epistemologically viable to refer to individuals‟ 
goals  on  a  large  scale,  as  defining  specification.  The  social 
element of these machines means that intentions may be useful in 
describing the work of these machines but may not help define 
characteristics  that  enable  us  to  predict  which  machines  may 
succeed or go “viral”. We might begin an account examining the 
overall  behaviour  of  the  machine  as  something  ontologically 
distinct from the inner states of its users, and where a goal can be 
specified as something that is emergent; defined, for example, via 
empirical  observation  of  network  characteristics  of  users‟ 
behaviour  en-masse.  Network  Science  aligns  itself  easily  with 
large–scale  phenomena,  such  as  “genetic”  variation,  allowing 
behavioural  analyses  that  might  have  predictive  success.  We 
suggest  that  a  social  machine  could  be  defined  as  a  Turing 
Machine  where  goals  are  mapped  out  as  emergent  exogenous 
behaviours defined via network characteristics. Key elements are: 
network  characteristics,  efficiency,  omnivorous  and  sometimes 
large-scale and / or aggregated use of data, and aligning incentives 
correctly between the social and the machine. 
So is it possible to balance a meaningful discussion of incentive 
against  the  behavioural  Network  Science  approach  advocated 
above? Can we run small-scale, empirical, crowd-sourced crime-
reporting experiments to explore some of the issues around using 
Network Science in order to make predictions about the success 
of such a social machine while using interviews and discourse-
based  methods  to  understand  more  the  feelings,  intentions and 
“goals”  of victims? Or should we confine ourselves to thought 
experiments?    Can  we  really  define  a  system  that  creates 
knowledge of crime to offset current open crime data or victim 
survey data? Could such a system change the transparency agenda 
–  showing  that  crowdsourced  data  can  feed  discussions  about 
accountability and provide some degree of balance to performance 
data produced by the people under scrutiny? 
Our thought experiment has shown that a multidisciplinary Web 
Science perspective is essential, combining Philosophy, Computer 
Science,  Network  Science,  Psychology,  Criminology  and  even 
Behavioural Economics in exploring varying types of knowledge 
of  crime  in  a  knowledge  economy.  Through  combining  these 
perspectives  and  theoretical  approaches  we  could  create  new 
architectures to shape the spaces of crime and crime reporting. 
This could help build up society‟s knowledge of crime. This feeds 
technologically  strategic  decision-making  on  crime  policy,  and discussions  on  crowdsourcing  accountability  data  to  offset 
statistics generated by those under scrutiny.  
But how far are our current conceptualisations going to take us 
when we consider the impacts of such technologies? How can we 
do justice – either to victims, or to the problem of defining large-
scale human phenomena such as massed goals and intentions in a 
space as sensitive as that of reporting crime, abuse or violence? 
The reduction of these phenomena to nodes and edges in networks 
risks losing the essence of the responsibilities – legal, ethical and 
social – of such a social machine. The unintended consequences 
of  implementing  a  machine  that  attempts  to  “fight  crime”  are 
likely  to  be  unacceptably  high  unless  we  consider  the 
ramifications  of  technology  attempting  to  solve  problems  of 
“social constraint” in more depth. 
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